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SUPREME COURT, U.S.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1977

No. 77-6769

CHARLES HUGH BROWN,

Petitioner,

-vs-

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

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May 1978

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IN THE

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No. 77-

CHARLES HUGH BROWN,

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-vs-

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

Petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the District Court of Appeal for the First District of the State of Florida, entered in the above entitled case on June 15, 1977.

OPINIONS BELOW

1. The decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, dated June 15, 1977, affirmed the Petitioner's conviction without opinion. That decision is unreported. Appendix infra, page 5A.

2. The opinion of the District Court of Appeal, First District, dated July 25, 1977, denied the Petition for Rehearing in the cause. That decision is unreported. Appendix infra, page 6A.

3. The opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida, dated December 8, 1977, denied a Petition for Certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First

District.[1] That decision is reported at 355 So.2d 512 (Fla. 1978). Appendix infra, pages 7A and 8A.

4. The opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida, dated February 20, 1978, denied the Petition for Rehearing of the denial of the Petition for Certiorari to the District Court of Appeal, First District. That opinion is unreported. Appendix infra, page 9A.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the District Court of Appeal, First District, State of Florida, was entered on June 15, 1977, and became final upon the entry of the Order of the Supreme Court of Florida denying the Petition for Rehearing, dated February 20, 1978. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1257(3).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Fourth Amendment permits unconsented night time entry of a dwelling to arrest all occupants therein, without warrant, in the complete absence of exigent circumstances.

2. Whether knowledge that contraband is stored in a separate garage, and that a sale of some of that contraband by an unidentified person has been effected, constitutes sufficient probable cause to enter a dwelling known to be occupied by several persons, at night, to arrest without warrant all occupants of the dwelling, absent exigent circumstances.

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[1] Under Art. V, §4(b)(1), Fla. Const., District Courts of Appeal are "the highest court of [the] State where a decision could be had," except where the District Court's opinion "is in direct conflict with a decision of any District Court of Appeal or of the Supreme Court on the same question of law." [Fla. Const. Art. V, §3(b)(3)], in which case review by the Supreme Court of Florida may be had by certiorari. Cf Williams v. Florida, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 399 U.S. 78, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1. This case involves the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

At 10:30 P. M. on May 24, 1975, an undercover agent of the Duval County Sheriff's Office arranged a "buy" of marijuana from one Anthony Cataldo. Mr. Cataldo had never been used as an informant before, nor had his reliability been previously established.[2] Upon completing the sale of approximately six pounds of marijuana to Officer D. E. Taylor, Cataldo was informed of Taylor's identity and arrested.[3]

Mr. Cataldo then informed Officer Taylor that the marijuana had been purchased from one Chuck Brown at 6209 Schindler Drive.[4] Mr. Cataldo stated that an additional 30 to 40 pounds of marijuana remained in the garage located behind the residence.[5] Mr. Cataldo did not state that any marijuana was observed in the dwelling, although he did indicate that "four or five people" were in the house at the time.[6]

Cataldo did not indicate that any of the occupants were armed, nor were any weapons found during the subsequent search of the house.[7] Cataldo gave no indication that any of the occupants of the dwelling were leaving or preparing to leave.[8] When asked if there was "any reason to believe that something

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2 R Vol. II, pages 56-7.

3 R Vol. II, page 20.

4 This statement was corroborated by the observations of Detective Howell, who had the house under surveillance and had seen Cataldo and an unidentified white male walk from behind the house with a package shortly before Cataldo's arrest. (R Vol. II, pages 125-26.

5 R Vol. II, pages 24-5.

6 R Vol. II, page 25.

7 R Vol. II, page 92.

8 R Vol. II, page 87.

might be destroyed at the house," Officer Taylor candidly admitted that "[w]e always have reason to believe that."[9]

Based solely on Cataldo's statements, corroborated by the observation of Detective Howell, Officer Taylor telephoned an Assistant State Attorney and was advised that, in the opinion of the State Attorney, probable cause existed to obtain a search warrant for the premises.[10] Although no exigent circumstances existed which weighed against waiting for the search warrant to be obtained, Officer Taylor immediately called in additional police officers and informed them that "it was our plan to go to the house and arrest the people inside."[11] Although Cataldo had identified Chuck Brown as the seller of the marijuana, the officers did not know which of the several occupants of the dwelling was Brown.[12] Officer Taylor "felt like...[all] the people had committed a felony...[and] this is the reason the people were arrested."[13] Notwithstanding the efforts to obtain a search warrant to authorize this night time incursion into a dwelling, Officer Taylor "[knew] enough about law enforcement that [he] didn't need an arrest warrant at that time."[14]

At approximately 1:45 A. M., four or five police cars drove to the residence at 6209 Shindler Drive.[15] The residence was completely fenced, necessitating that the police officers drive through a gate and "onto the property to make the arrests."[16] Upon exiting their cars, the officers observed an unidentified white male who had just walked from the dwelling to stand on the stoop. The white male was immediately arrested and

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9 R Vol. II, page 59.

10 A search warrant was, in fact, obtained several hours later. R Vol. I, pages 1 through 5.

11 R Vol. II, page 28.

12 R Vol. II, page 40.

13 R pages 47-8.

14 R Vol. II, pages 60-61.

15 R Vol. II, pages 29-31.

16 R Vol. II, pages 88-89.

subsequently identified as the Petitioner, Charles Brown.[17]

Without knocking or announcing in any way their presence or authority,[18] the policemen entered the house and began a room to room search. At that point, according to Detective Taylor, the police officers "were searching for bodies [to arrest].... We felt like we could do our searching [for contraband] later when we returned with our search warrant."[19] Some contraband was seized incident to these arrests and, three hours later, the search warrant was obtained and executed, yielding 180 pounds of marijuana from the garage.

A Motion to Suppress the contraband was timely filed with the trial Court, alleging, inter alia, that the defendant's arrest without warrant under these facts was in violation of his constitutional rights.[20] That motion was denied by the trial Court, following an evidentiary hearing.[21] Thereafter, on November 4, 1975, the Petitioner pled nolo contendere to the charge of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell, as well as possession of paraphernalia, and was sentenced to two five year sentences, to run consecutively.[22] The plea of nolo contendere specifically reserved the right to appeal the trial Court's denial of the Motion to Suppress.

An appeal was timely filed with the District Court of Appeal for the First District, assigning as error the trial Court's denial of the Petitioner's Motion to Suppress[23] and asserting that his "warrantless arrest...was illegal and unconstitutional...." On June 15, 1977, the District Court of

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17 "Although the police officers, having advanced through the gate, up the driveway, and onto the porch, then smelled burning marijuana, as Officer Taylor candidly admitted, "I was...going to move in and arrest the people, had I smelled the marijuana or not." (R Vol. II, page 48).

18 R Vol. II, pages 44-45.

19 R Vol. II, page 63. [App., infra, page 1A]

20 R Vol. I, page 17. [App., infra, page 4A]

21 R Vol. I, page 20.

22 R Vol. I, pages 26-27.

23 R Vol. I, page 35.

Appeal for the First District affirmed the conviction, and, on July 25, 1977, denied Brown's Petition for Rehearing.

Thereafter, a Petition for Certiorari was timely filed with the Florida Supreme Court, which denied certiorari by its Order dated February 20, 1978.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I

This Petition raises the question of whether, and under what circumstances, police may forcibly enter a dwelling, at night, for the purpose of arresting all of its occupants without benefit of an arrest warrant. This "grave constitutional question,"[24] first posed by Mr. Justice Harlan, remains unanswered[25] by this Court. While the Court has previously considered whether arrests conformed with the constitutional standard,[26] the rule which has been enunciated has emerged from the decisions of the Circuit Courts. Given the "history of the use, and not infrequent abuse of the power to arrest,"[27] the rule which has emerged from the decisions of the Circuit Courts[27a] establishes that the Fourth Amendment requires a negative answer to the question presented. It is therefore submitted that the decision of the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, has decided an important

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24 Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499-500, 2 L.Ed.2d 1514, 78 S.Ct. 1253 (1958).

25 Gerstein v. Pugh, 428 U.S. 103, 113 n 13, 43 L.Ed.2d 54, 95 S.Ct. 854 (1975). This Court recently held that "a duly authorized law enforcement officer [may] make a warrantless arrest in a public place even though he had adequate opportunity to procure a warrant after developing probable cause for arrest", without violating the Fourth Amendment. U.S. v. Watson, 46 L.Ed.2d 598, 611 (Howell, J concurring), specifically reserving the question here presented.

26 Cf Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 13 L.Ed.2d 142, 85 S.Ct. 223, 3 O.Misc. 71, 31 O.Ops.2d 80 (1964); Kerr v. California, 374 U.S.23, 10 L.Ed.2d 726, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 24 O.Ops.2d 201 (1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 3 L.Ed.2d 327, 79 S.Ct. 329 (1959); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 2 L.Ed.2d 1503, 78 S.Ct. 1245 (1958).

27 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 83 S.Ct. 407 (1963).

27a As will be shown in Part III, infra, the requirement of exigent circumstances has been inferentially accepted by this Court. U.S. v. Santana, ____U.S.____, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976)

question of Federal law which has not, but should be, settled by this Court. Additionally, as will be shown in part II, infra, the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, has decided a Federal question in a way which conflicts with the applicable decisional authority as to the modicum of probable cause necessary to prevent a warrantless incursion into a private dwelling, at night, for the purpose of making an arrest.

The Fourth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:

> The right of the people to be secure in their...houses...against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.

It has been long recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects a right of privacy against unwarranted incursions by the police and other governmental officials. Perhaps the greatest protection secured by the Fourth Amendment is the right of the people to exclude the police from breaking into their homes, at night, without a warrant. Recognizing that "[t]he right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is...a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance",[28] the Courts have routinely held that a warrantless police incursion into private property, in a "search" context is per se unreasonable unless authorized by a warrant with the sole exception being viewed as one to permit prompt and necessary action in emergency situations.[29] Although the applicable standards for obtaining a search warrant have been

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28 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 369, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948).

29 Cf Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967).

discussed at length by this Court, the Court below applied a different standard to the incursion here involved because it was characterized as an "arrest" as opposed to a "search", therefore distinguishing all of the protections of the Fourth Amendment and restricting their inquiry to the presence or absence of "probable cause." But, as noted by Judge Prettyman, the characterization of the police action as an "arrest" as opposed to a "search" is a distinction without constitutional difference.

> The officers entered the house to make a search. It was, to be sure, a search for a person rather than the usual search for an article of property, but it was a search. The officers made this indubitably clear in their testimony; they went into the house to look for [Petitioner]. It is true they intended to arrest him if they found him, and so the ultimate objective was an arrest. The government urges that this latter fact requires that we apply the rules of law pertaining to arrest rather than the rules governing search. But the search was a factual prerequisite to an arrest; it was the first objective of the entry; the officers did in fact search the house. They entered to make a search as a necessary prerequisite to possible arrest.
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> Morrison v. United States, 104 U.S. App. D.C., 352-355, 262 F.2d 449, 452 (1958).

That is not to say that all warrantless arrests are, per se, invalid for this Court has recognized several exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's general requirement for a warrant describing the "person...to be seized." First, and most obvious, is the situation where a suspect is reasonably believed to be armed and dangerous. Delay in arresting such a subject may well increase the danger to the community in the interim, and to the officers at the time of arrest. This consideration would bear materially on the ability of police to effectuate a warrantless arrest, even in a residence.[30]

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[30] Cf Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967); Chappell v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 356, 352 F.2d 935 (1965).

Secondly, where there is strong reason to believe that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended, or that a delay will permit the destruction of evidence by the suspect, arrest without warrant may be justified.[30a] Other considerations, including the gravity of the offense involved;[31] the modicum of probable cause available; and the circumstances under which the entry is made may affect the ability of police officers to arrest without warrant.

However, none of those factors was present in this case. The testimony at the Motion to Suppress unequivocally demonstrated that the prospective arrestee and other occupants of the house were unarmed; there was no danger of the destruction of evidence pending the three hour delay necessary to obtain the search warrant; no indication of impending departure by any occupant of the house was noted; and the sum total of the probable cause available to the police was that contraband was contained in a building contiguous to the premises under the control of an as yet unidentified white male.

At least four Circuits have adopted criteria for warrantless arrests in the home. The criteria were first set forth in the en banc decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in Dorman v. United States, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 313, 435 F.2d 385, 392 (1970). These criteria include the commission of a grave offense; a belief that the suspect is armed; probable cause to believe the suspect has committed the crime; suspicion that the suspect is on the premises; likelihood of escape if delay ensues; and the peaceful entry onto the premises by the police. These criteria have been adopted in the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. Salvador v. United States, 505 F.2d 1348 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.

30a Cf U.S. v. Santana, supra and Part III, infra.

31 See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, supra, McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) (concurring opinion of Justice Jackson).

Shye, 492 F.2d 886 (6th Cir. 1974); Vance v. North Carolina, 432 F.2d 984 (4th Cir. 1970). The application of these criteria to the decision below amply demonstrates the violation of the Fourth Amendment sanctioned in this cause.

II

One of the criteria utilized in determining whether a warrantless incursion into the privacy of a residence, at night, for the purpose of making an arrest, is the quantum of probable cause available at the time of the entry into the home. As the Second Circuit noted in Dorman v. United States, supra, "[t]here is some indication that at common law the degree of proof in hand was material in determining whether there was not merely probable cause for arrest, but authority for a 'breaking'." See Judge Prettyman's opinion in Accarino v. United States, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 394, 398-400, 179 F.2d 456, 460-61 (1949), cited as a comprehensive discussion in Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958). The necessity for establishing a requirement for a high degree of probable cause in order to justify a warrantless incursion into a home, at night, is amply demonstrated by the facts of this case.

Upon arresting Mr. Cataldo and learning that he has purchased the marijuana from Chuck Brown at 6209 Shindler Drive, Detective Taylor called an Assistant State Attorney and was told that probable cause existed to obtain a search warrant for the home in question. The protection afforded by the warrant requirement, however, was illusory since the police accomplished the same incursion into the Petitioner's home through the simple expediency of characterizing their actions as an "arrest" rather than a search. Thus, while a belief "however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a search of

that house without a warrant. And such searches are held unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause",[32] the Court below has held that the same knowledge authorizes a forcible entry into that dwelling house by the police without warrant, for the purpose of making an arrest. The Fourth Amendment's protection of people in the privacy of their home cannot turn on so nice a distinction.

The Court below, by authorizing the police intrusion into the Petitioner's home, late at night, on the minimal probable cause available to them at the time that intrusion was made, clearly "leave[s] law abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice..." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 93 L.Ed. 1879, 69 S.Ct. 1302 (1949). Not only do the police have no incentive to obtain an arrest warrant under the rule of law sanctioned below, they have been affirmatively shown that the Fourth Amendment strictures applicable to searches and seizures can be easily circumvented by the pretext of characterizing their night time incursion into the home as a "search for bodies" as distinguished from a "search for evidence." It is respectfully submitted that, in the absence of any exigent circumstances or a quantum of probable cause well in excess of that evidenced in this cause, the search permitted here violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, regardless of the object of that search.

III

This Court examined a similar question in United States v. Santana, supra. There, the question presented was whether a warrantless day time arrest, in a "public place" violated the Fourth Amendment. This Court held that, under the facts

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[32] Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33, 46 S.Ct. 4, 6, 70 L.Ed. 145 (1925).

presented in Santana, supra, the warrantless arrest of the petitioner was not violative of the Fourth Amendment. The facts in United States v. Santana, supra, when compared to the facts in the instant case, support the argument herein contained and amply demonstrate the necessity of further consideration of this issue by the Court.

Santana also involved a "buy" by an undercover narcotics officer from a third party, one Patricia McCafferty. Unlike Mr. Cataldo, Patricia McCafferty had been involved in previous narcotics transactions involving the same undercover agent. Immediately after the "buy" was consummated, the officer returned to the location of the sale and, without entering onto private property, drew "within 15 feet of Santana and got out of their van, shouting 'police,' and displaying their identification. As the officers approached, Santana retreated into the vestibule of her house."[33] Id. at 304.

In the context of a day time arrest, the Court considered the relevant factors in determining whether a violation of the Fourth Amendment had occurred. First, the Court noted that Ms. Santana "was not merely visible to the public but as exposed to public view, speech, hearing and touch as if she had been standing completely outside her house."[34] Therefore, when the police attempted to arrest her "they merely intended to perform a function which [the Court] had approved in Watson." Id.

The Court then considered the question of whether the fact that Santana attempted to thwart her otherwise lawful

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33 These facts are in sharp contrast to those presented here. Here, the delay between the narcotics "buy" and the subsequent arrest was a matter of hours, not minutes. The police in this cause neither identified themselves as police officers nor announced their purpose prior to entering onto the private property. Additionally, it affirmatively appears that no one was visible to the policemen in this cause prior to their driving through the gate and up the driveway in order to arrest all occupants of the house. Unlike Santana, this arrest occurred late at night, and did not involve "hot pursuit" to justify the police intrusion into the residence.

34 United States v. Santana, supra, at 305.

arrest by retreating into her house would cloak her with additional Fourth Amendment protections. While inferentially recognizing additional Fourth Amendment protections, not recognized in Watson, where entry into a domicile was required, the Court considered the types of exigent circumstances which have been required by the Circuit Courts.[35] The Court noted specifically that delay in arresting Ms. Santana would likely result in a destruction of the evidence necessary for her conviction. The Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment's protection of domicile was severely limited in a case involving "hot pursuit." [36] It is respectfully submitted that this Court's decision in United States v. Santana, supra, cannot be read to per se justify all warrantless arrests in a domicile during the day, nor does it intimate that no additional justification is necessary where such an arrest is to be effected late at night. Santana simply stands for the proposition that "a suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place...by the expedient escaping to a private place."[37] In the absence of the exigent circumstances specifically noted, and inferentially required, in this Court's opinion in United States v. Santana, supra, it is respectfully submitted that the Fourth Amendment's protections against police intrusion into a domicile at night, without warrant, cannot be countenanced under the clear command of the Fourth Amendment.

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully urged that this Court should issue its Writ of Certiorari to the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida; establish that the Fourth

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35 See Part I, infra.

36 Cf Warden v. Hayden, supra, Johnson v. United States, supra.

37 United States v. Santana, supra, at 306.

Amendment does not permit an unconsented night time entry of a dwelling to arrest all occupants therein without warrant in the absence of exigent circumstances; the contrary decision rendered by the Court below, and remand the case for further proceedings in accordance with this Court's decision.

Respectfully submitted,

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By 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was mailed this 17th day of May, 1978 to Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General, State of Florida, The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 32304.



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TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF FLORIDA

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

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BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

Respondent accepts the statements under this subheading in petitioner's petition for writ of certiorari on pp. 1, 2 thereof as being correct.

JURISDICTION

Respondent has no quarrel with the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, §1257(3), or any other provision thereof at least for the purpose of determining whether to decline assumption thereof.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Respondent rejects the questions presented as framed by petitioner because same contain conclusions of the pleader and assumes affirmative or negative answers to questions that this Court must decide. Accordingly, respondent restates the questions presented as follows:

QUESTION ONE

WHETHER PETITIONER'S ARREST WAS SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE PROBABLE CAUSE.

QUESTION TWO

WHETHER THE AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Respondent is submitting under separate cover a copy of the complete record (four volumes) that was filed in the District Court of Appeal, First District, Florida. References to this record will be made by the symbol "R" followed by appropriate volume and page number.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

In the trial court, petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere reserving his right to appeal the denial of a motion to suppress (R Vol.I, p. 24)[1]. He was sentenced to five years on Count 1 and five years on Count 2 with said sentences being made to run consecutively (R Vol.I, pp. 26, 27). On appeal to the Florida First District Court of Appeal, petitioner's conviction was affirmed per curiam by opinion filed June 15, 1977. Petition for rehearing was denied July 25, 1977 following which petitioner filed his petition for writ of certiorari in the Florida Supreme Court

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1. All references except when otherwise designated are to the record on appeal as filed in the District Court of Appeal, First District, Florida.

on August 4, 1977 which was denied by order of that court dated December 8, 1977.

Officer D. E. Taylor working undercover met Anthony J. Cataldo at approximately 10:30 p.m. on May 24, 1975. Cataldo advised that he had a large quantity of marijuana and Taylor said he was interested in purchasing twenty pounds (R Vol.II, p. 11). This was a situation where Cataldo could not take Taylor directly to the source but agreed to take him to a location near the source. Taylor gave him $820 front money with which to buy twenty pounds of marijuana (R Vol.II, p. 12). After agreeing to the terms, Cataldo directed Taylor to a location near the intersection of Valdura and 103rd Street. It was then that Taylor gave him the money. Cataldo advised that he would return in a few minutes with the marijuana (R Vol.II, p. 13). Taylor had an idea as to where Cataldo would obtain the marijuana and had a surveillance team, Officers Howell and Higginbotham, set up on the premises located at 6209 Shindler Drive which Taylor believed to be occupied by Chuck Brown. Taylor was in radio contact with the surveillance unit (R Vol.II, p. 14). Taylor had reason to believe that Mr. Brown was involved in heavy drug traffic (R Vol.II, p. 15).

When Cataldo departed from the rendezvous at Valdura and 103rd Street to make the purchase of marijuana, he advised that when he returned in a few minutes, Taylor was to follow him down Valdura Street and that he (Cataldo) would pull off the road and turn the marijuana over to Taylor (R Vol.II, p. 17). The $820 front money that Taylor gave to Cataldo was marked in the sense that Taylor had the

serial numbers for the bills. When Cataldo departed, Taylor advised the surveillance unit and requested them to make contact if and when Cataldo arrived at 6209 Shindler Drive. Cataldo was driving a green Chevrolet Monza (R Vol.II, p. 18). In approximately a minute and a half to two minutes, the surveillance unit notified Taylor that Cataldo had pulled into the driveway of the premises located at 6209 Shindler Drive. Approximately ten minutes later, Taylor was notified by Officer Howell that Cataldo was backing out of the driveway and approximately one half to two minutes later he arrived at the rendezvous point, and Taylor followed him down Valdura Road at which time Cataldo turned over to him six pounds of marijuana (R Vol.II, pp. 19, 20). At this point, Taylor placed Cataldo under arrest and advised him of his rights (R Vol.II, p. 20). After advising Cataldo of his rights, Taylor questioned him, and Cataldo advised that he had been to the house on Shindler Drive and got the marijuana from a man named Chuck Brown. Cataldo also told Taylor that Brown had told him that he had already sold 400 pounds of marijuana that day (R Vol.II, pp. 21, 23). In addition to the six pounds of marijuana that Cataldo had in his possession for the purpose of turning over to Taylor, he also had two twenty dollar bills of the marked money that Taylor had given with which to purchase the twenty pounds of marijuana (R Vol.II, p. 23). Cataldo advised that he was paying $130 a pound for the marijuana and selling it for $160 a pound. Cataldo advised that he couldn't see any additional marijuana at Brown's house, but that Brown had advised him he had at least twenty pounds because that was the amount that Taylor initially planned to buy (R Vol.II, p. 24).

As to the exact location on the premises where the marijuana came from Cataldo said that it came from the garage (R Vol.II, p. 25). After placing Cataldo under arrest and searching him, Taylor next advised the surveillance unit that the buy had been consummated and Cataldo placed under arrest. Subsequently, Taylor telephoned an assistant state attorney and advised as to what had transpired and sought advice as to what should be done next. The assistant state attorney told Taylor that he believed there was sufficient probable cause to get a search warrant (R Vol.II, p. 27). Following the phone call, Taylor and other officers went to the premises at 6209 Shindler Drive. Taylor was in the first car that arrived at the premises and as he got out of the car, a man came out of the back door, a man Taylor subsequently discovered to be Chuck Brown. Taylor was standing right at the back door of the house and advised him of his identity and that he was under arrest. At the same time, Taylor could smell burning marijuana from inside the residence. Another officer behind Taylor came up and detained Brown while Taylor went into the residence and walked into a little dining room area which projects into the kitchen. At this point, Taylor saw four or five people sitting around the table, one of which was smoking a marijuana cigarette. He advised all of the individuals that they were under arrest and then checked the rest of the house to determine whether anybody else was inside. All of the individuals were taken into the dining area and searched. As a result, the marked bills initially given to Cataldo were recovered from Chuck Brown's pocket. All of the individuals with the exception of Brown were transported to jail. Officers Howell and Higginbotham remained with Brown until Taylor could return with a search warrant for the purpose of searching the premises. None of the officers present on the scene conducted any form of a search

of the house or the garage at that point (R Vol.II, pp. 28-30).

On cross-examination, at the suppression hearing, Taylor testified that Brown told him that he lived there and was the only person that lived there (R Vol.II, pp. 39, 40). A search warrant was obtained issued by Judge Richardson and pursuant thereto the premises were searched and the officers recovered 180 pounds of marijuana, a number of marijuana plants, marijuana pipes and things of this nature (R Vol.II, pp. 36, 37). The search warrant was issued for the premises and the curtilage thereof described in the search warrant. The search warrant and affidavit, together with the inventory and receipt is found at R Vol.I, pp. 1-5.

Officer Howell was located across the street from the premises about 125 feet with a clear view (R Vol.II, p. 124). Between 12:00 midnight and 12:10 a.m., the officer observed a dark green Monza enter the yard and drive up to the house. A driver exited the automobile and walked around to an area in the back of the house. A few minutes later, he reappeared with another individual and walked down beside the garage where Howell lost sight of them for three or four minutes. Then two individuals reappeared and walked up to the automobile. The taller of the two placed a bundle or package in the front from the driver's side of the Monza. In other words, the taller person was not the person who drove up in the car. When the Monza left the premises, Officer Howell immediately radioed Officer Taylor and advised that the Monza was headed back in his direction (R Vol.II, pp. 125, 127).

ARGUMENT

QUESTION ONE

WHETHER PETITIONER'S ARREST WAS SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE PROBABLE CAUSE.

If the facts set forth in this brief are insufficient to provide adequate probable cause to support a felony arrest, then the police officers of this state might just as well fold up their tents and silently steal away. In United States v. Lipscomb, 435 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1971), the Fifth Circuit sustained an arrest on probable cause even though the officers had an opportunity to secure a warrant before the arrest. Sub judice, there was no such opportunity. Respondent relies on Johnson v. United States, 328 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied 13 L.Ed.2d 1953; Casso v. State, 182 So.2d 252 (Fla.App. 2 1966); Salas v. State, 246 So. 2d 621 (Fla.App. 3 1971); Crawford v. State, 334 So.2d 141 (Fla.App. 3 1976). It should be firmly kept in mind that the statements made by Cataldo to Taylor were against his own penal interest. See State v. Patterson, 309 So. 2d 555 (Fla.App. 2 1975); and United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 29 L.Ed.2d 723, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (1971).

Petitioner did not indulge in the futile effort of challenging in the court below the search of his person and the search of other persons found on the premises when such searches were incident to the arrests made. At this late date, no one should question the right of an officer to search a person after a valid arrest. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); and Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973).

QUESTION TWO

WHETHER THE AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.

The above question is answered in the negative. The issue in search warrant proceedings is not guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but probable cause for believing the occurrence of a crime and the secreting of evidence in specific premises. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 29 L.Ed.2d 723, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (1971). As was said in Harrington v. State, 110 So. 2d 495 (Fla.App. 1 1959):

> "The test is not whether the affiant should or should not rely on the information provided by the informer, but simply whether he did rely upon it and whether the circumstances stated by the affidavit are reasonably sufficient to warrant the conclusion that it is likely the law is being violated."

See also Treverrow v. State, 194 So.2d 250 (Fla. 1967).

Indeed, in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 21 L.Ed.2d 637, 89 S.Ct. 584, this Court said that "only the probability and not a prima facie showing of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant."

A Florida court in Paula v. State, 188 So.2d 388 (Fla.App. 2 1966), followed these lines and held that "probable cause for search and seizure with or without a search warrant involves probabilities which are not technical but factual and practical considerations of every day life upon which reasonable and prudent men act, and the essence of probable cause is a reasonable ground for the belief of guilt."

In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 12 L.Ed.2d 723, 84 S.Ct. 1509 (1964), this Court considered the matter of hearsay in affidavits and held:

> "Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the natcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, was 'credible' or his information reliable."

Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, 80 S.Ct. 725, went on to state that "hearsay evidence may provide the probable cause necessary for the issuance of a search warrant where a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay evidence is presented." And concerning an affiant's personal observation, "an affidavit is not to be deemed insufficient because of observations of those other than affiant."

Although Florida courts have adopted this standard, the Supreme Court of Florida has stated that an affidavit for a search warrant which is otherwise sufficient is not tainted by reference to a confidential tip, even though the tip be inadequate itself. State v. Smith, 233 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1970). The Second District Court of Appeal also added in State v. Lewis, 225 So.2d 170 (Fla.App. 1969), that an affidavit need not allege that the informant is a reliable source.

In the more recent case of Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 28 L.Ed.2d 306, 91 S.Ct. 1031 (1971), although it was reversed in favor of Whiteley, an important point was brought out. Arresting officers often act on the assumption

that fellow officers who call upon them to make an arrest have probable cause for believing the arrestees are perpetrators of a crime. To prevent the officers from assuming this would unduly hamper law enforcement.

In the landmark decision of United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 29 L.Ed.2d 723, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (1971), probable cause to search a suspected moonshiner's premises was established by an affidavit based largely on hearsay obtained from a prudent person who had recent personal knowledge of a suspect's illegal whiskey sales and admitted participation in the illegal activity.

However, in United States ex rel DiRienzo v. Yeager, 443 F.2d 228 (3rd Cir. 1971), the informer is found to be reliable because his admission was against his own penal interest, the informant admitting he and defendant were partners in crime and describing the items that were stolen and that such items were hidden in the defendant's apartment. This Court in United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 13 L.Ed.2d 684, 85 S.Ct. 741, added:

> "Where an affidavit for a search warrant detains the underlying circumstances upon which is based a belief that probable cause exists, reason for crediting the source of the information is given, and a magistrate has found probable cause, the courts should not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense manner and should resolve doubtful or marginal cases according to the preference to be accorded to warrants."

The procedure for finding probable cause and issuing search warrants is supported by the expression of the Supreme Court of New Jersey (State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377, 201 A.2d 39), which this Court adopted in

McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 18 L.Ed.2d 62, 87 S.Ct. 1056, at 1060:

> "The 4th Amendment is served if a judicial mind passes upon the existence of probable cause. When the issue is submitted upon an application for a warrant, the magistrate is trusted to evaluate the credibility of the affiant in an ex parte proceeding. As we have said, the magistrate is concerned, not with whether the informant lied, but whether the affiant is truthful in his recitation of what he was told. If the magistrate doubts the credibility of the affiant, he may require that the informant be identified or even produced."

Respondent contends that the facts stated in the affidavit for search warrant were more than adequate to furnish the requisite probable cause for the issuance of the warrant.

Respondent urges the court to read the affidavit in a "commonsense" manner as suggested by United States v. Ventresca, supra. Petitioner seems to be arguing that there were false statements in the affidavit. The rule seems to be that only deliberate inclusion of a false statement or a reckless inclusion of a false material statement should be fatal to an affidavit for search warrant. United States v. Luna, 525 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1975). See also United States v. Thomas, 489 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Marihart, 492 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 42 L.Ed.2d 51; United States v. Pond, 523 F.2d 210 (2nd Cir. 1975), cert. denied 96 S.Ct. 794. We close on this issue of probable cause by quoting from the argument of Assistant State Attorney Dubray:

> "Here the officer had in his knowledge and information, firsthand information, six pounds of cannabis which he paid marked money for; that a felony had, in fact, been committed from the premises which he already had suspicion to believe were going to be used for

that specific purpose. The testimony is uncontested this was, in fact, the premises of that person who had been dealing; it was under surveillance at that point for the purpose of setting up and possibly making a buy out of those premises, a person who was dealing in drugs. That surveillance corroborated what Officer Taylor said, that Cataldo had gone to that residence, obtained a quantity of substance from there and paid for it with marked money. The officer did as any reasonable officer with his experience would do, go to the premises and attempt to secure the premises and obtain a search warrant therefor. I think it's significant in the officer's testimony and to his credit and to his experience that when he entered the premises he did not even search that tin box that was on the table in front of all the individuals. Knowing that a search warrant could be obtained for the premises, his desire at that time being to secure the premises and the people located thereon."

(R Vol.II, p. 144)

CONCLUSION

The petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

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